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Organised crime is diverse and complex and
poses a major challenge for law enforcement
agencies on both sides of the Irish border. Thanks
to excellent engagement between these agencies
we continue to disrupt and dismantle those
Organised Crime Groups (OCGs) who would
seek to profit from various forms of organised
criminality and cause great harm within our
communities. Our land border provides an
opportunity for OCGs to operate in both
jurisdictions, with free movement between
Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland,
which they use to facilitate their criminality.
Through ongoing communication, intelligence-
sharing, joint investigations and the creation of
cross border working groups, we continue to
thwart the efforts of these OCGs.  
In November 2015, the British and Irish
Governments and the Northern Ireland Executive
agreed a series of measures in A Fresh Start, The
Stormont Agreement and Implementation Plan.
This saw the introduction of a new Cross Border
Joint Agency Task Force. The Joint Agency Task
Force is led by senior officers from the Police
Service of Northern Ireland, An Garda Síochána,
the Revenue Commissioners and HM Revenue
and Customs. A number of other organisations
including the National Crime Agency and the
Criminal Assets Bureau are also involved in
operational activity. The Task Force has already
met on multiple occasions and agreed upon a
number of areas of organised criminality, which
have received focused attention over the last six
months. The Joint Agency Task Force enhances
and strengthens further the established working
relationships between law enforcement agencies
north and south. Continued cross border co-
operation is key to the fight against organised
crime on this island.
The annual Cross Border Organised Crime
Seminar is now in its 14th year. This provides an
invaluable opportunity for law enforcement
agencies to discuss experiences, share knowledge
and address any potential impediments to the
fight against organised criminality.  
We are pleased to present the 7th Biennial Cross
Border Organised Crime Threat Assessment,
which provides an insight into organised
criminality on both sides of the border. Trends
and developments across both jurisdictions are
compared in an effort to highlight similarities and
differences in the threat posed by certain areas of
criminal activity. Due to our shared land border it
is often the case that we see displacement of
criminal activity from one jurisdiction to the other.
Strong working relationships allow us to quickly
respond to these challenges and learn from each
other’s experiences, which ultimately makes for a
greater force in the fight against organised crime. 
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ABUSE OF THE COMMON TRAVEL AREA3.0
Current Threat 
A Common Travel Area (CTA) is in existence
between the Republic of  Ireland (ROI) and the
United Kingdom (UK). This provides major
benefits (economic, cultural and societal) to those
who live and work in both jurisdictions and
enabling and encouraging the free movement of
goods, money, people and information. It,
however could be open to exploitation by
criminals, illegal immigrants and extremists who
use the border to facilitate and enable criminality. 
CTA Abuse via the Land Border
The border between Northern Ireland (NI) and
the Republic of Ireland (ROI) covers 224 miles
from Lough Foyle in the west to Carlingford
Lough. There is free movement between the ROI
and NI, meaning individuals and commodities
travel, often without being stopped and without
any record existing of that movement having
taken place. Organised Crime Groups (OCGs)
regularly utilise the CTA to enable or enhance
their criminality and to avoid detection by law
enforcement agency partners. Criminality
includes the smuggling of various illicit
commodities including drugs, fuel, firearms,
counterfeit and contraband cigarettes and
alcohol. 
Immigration issues are a key reason for use of the
land border to avoid detection travelling onto the
UK mainland or into the ROI. Once illegal
immigrants enter NI they often travel via a
seaport where there are less stringent
identification requirements. The proximity of the
City of Derry Airport to the land border creates
an opportunity for the facilitation of illegal
immigration into the ROI due to the short
distance from the land border..
CTA Abuse involving Haulage Companies 
Criminal hauliers are having a detrimental impact
on the NI haulage industry due to the fact they
operate their business at rates which are difficult
for legitimate hauliers to match, off-setting their
costs through illegal activities.
Northern Irish and ROI based criminal hauliers
have links to OCGs involved in a range of
criminality, including the movement of weapons,
controlled drugs, alcohol, fuel and people.
Criminal hauliers are known to alter or use a
range of false documentation in addition to
developing new and diverse methods of
concealing illegal goods on freight trailers and
containers.
OCGs are known to make use of Roll On Roll
Off (RoRo) containers for criminal gain. This is
perceived by criminals as a low risk method of
transportation due to the vast number of
containers that are being moved across Great
Britain/NI/ROI ports. Hauliers may be complicit
in leaving or collecting suspect containers or
simply utilised by other OCGs to unknowingly
facilitate this activity.  Indeed drivers in general
may be unaware that they are transporting illegal
goods.
Examples of cross border issues in relation to  
criminal hauliers include the following:
a. HGV drivers who have been disqualified in one 
jurisdiction obtaining licences in the other.
b. Both NI and ROI companies are operating their   
lorries from depots within Great Britain and      
OCGs have established a significant criminal 
network of hauliers that can maximise the use 
of lorries, trailers and drivers in order to   
facilitate cross channel / Irish Sea smuggling  
activity.
c. Issues surrounding subcontracting, leasing of 
vehicles, self-employed drivers and    
geographical boundaries enable criminal   
hauliers to operate in a low risk / large scale  
environment.
d. Difficulties for law enforcement agencies 
include the sheer scale of vehicles / containers 
travelling through the Ports, the methodology 
of concealing illegal goods within legitimate 
loads and the ability to travel across the CTA 
without a requirement to provide / record 
identification.
There are significant interactions and
relationships between OCGs operating on both
sides of the border who  work together across a
number of types of organised crime. Almost half
of all OCGs managed and investigated by the
Police Service of Northern Ireland are known to
have strong links and associations with OCGs
based in the Republic of Ireland. 
Mobile organised crime groupings have been an
issue across the island in recent years. A number
of groups travelling inter-regionally throughout
the Republic of Ireland have been carrying out
burglaries of commercial and residential
properties. Numerous incidents highlight cross
border activity in this regard also, with OCGs
from the Republic of Ireland travelling into
Northern Ireland to commit crimes and vice
versa. These groupings readily engage in violence
meaning victims and indeed anyone who disturbs
their activities, including law enforcement
personnel, are at risk. 
The chart above provides a visual representation
of the nature of these links. At least 28 have
recently engaged in drug related criminality,
primarily the purchase and subsequent
importation of drugs (including heroin, cocaine
and cannabis) into Northern Ireland. In order to
undertake this criminality, mutually beneficial
business relationships have been developed
between OCGs across each jurisdiction. At least
nine OCGs have been engaged in criminality
relating to tax and excise evasion (primarily the
smuggling of contraband and counterfeit goods).
OCGs based in Northern Ireland have also used
the land border with the Republic of Ireland to
enable and facilitate other organised criminality
including burglary, agricultural crime, the
purchase and movement of firearms, plant theft
and human trafficking. A number of these OCGs
are also involved in money laundering activities.
This includes currency exchange, the purchase of
property and setting up commercial interests in
the other jurisdiction. 
There has been a substantial increase in the
number of foreign national OCGs known to be
involved in organised crime across Northern
Ireland. These groups have origins in, and links
to, South East Asia, Africa, Portugal, Spain, Italy,
Russia, Lithuania, Albania, Romania and other
countries within eastern Europe. These groups
bring new methodologies and can be more
challenging to investigate, due to issues such as
language barriers. These groups often commit
offences in both jurisdictions. Recent successes
against a number of these OCGs tends to
support intelligence that these groups are
involved in a wide range of organised criminal
offences including, the importation, cultivation
and distribution of drugs, human trafficking,
labour and sexual exploitation, fraud, cybercrime,
money laundering and organised theft. 
The nationality of these OCGs means they do
not operate exclusively in Northern Ireland, but
take advantage of the CTA to travel to the
Republic of Ireland and back to Europe on a
regular basis. This travel is often used following
serious incidents to remove offenders from the
jurisdiction and also to transport the proceeds of
their criminality back to their home countries. 
It is suspected that a number of principal
members of these OCGs are based in the
Republic of Ireland and regularly receive finance
from their illegal operations in Northern Ireland.
Members of paramilitary groups continue to
engage in organised crime. Some of this is
committed on both sides of the border. 
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ORGANISED CRIME GROUPS (OCGs) 4.0
Drugs Criminality
Smuggling/IPC
Agricultural Crime
Cross Border Burglary
Extortion
Buy/Sell Firearms
Other
8Cross Border Organised Crime Assessment 2016
CROSS BORDER ORGANISED CRIME5.0
5.1 Drugs
The Threat 
Harm caused by drugs and drug related
criminality is a common concern raised by
communities on both sides of the border.  The
ability of police and other agencies to manage this
issue affects public confidence.  In Northern
Ireland during 2015/16 there was an increase in
the number of arrests, charges and seizure
incidents compared to the previous financial year.
The illicit drugs market on both sides of the
border has changed in recent years and has
become more diverse.  The emergence of a new
range of psychoactive substances has altered the
dynamic of drug misuse among young people in
terms of how they source drugs in open and
closed markets. The online availability of drugs
via the open internet and 'darknet' represents the
modern era of drug dealing which brings with it
significant challenges for law enforcement
globally.
OCGs across the island continue to profit most
from the traditionally known drugs and many
features of the criminal enterprise in terms of the
importation and distribution of these drugs
remain unchanged.  In 2014 almost €63 million
worth of controlled drugs were seized in the
Republic of Ireland. This compares to €65 million
in 2013, €115 million in 2012, €56 million in
2011, €46 million in 2010 and €179 million in
2009.
Cannabis continues to be the most prevalent
controlled drug on both sides of the border. It
achieves the highest market value in the
European Union at €20 per gram. In 2014 over
€40 million worth of cannabis was seized in the
Republic of Ireland, most of which was in the
form of cannabis herb or plants.  Drug treatment
centres have recently reported that there are
more new treatment referrals for cannabis than
any other type of drug (in both jurisdictions).
Cannabis continues to be the most commonly
seized drug in Northern Ireland, with significant
amounts of herbal cannabis, resin and plants
seized. Seizures of cannabis resin are showing a
rise in Northern Ireland but this is principally due
to a single large seizure in April 2015. An
increase has also been noted in both the number
of seizure incidents and in the amount of herbal
cannabis seized compared to the financial year
2014/2015.
Since 2007 herbal cannabis has been cultivated
domestically in Ireland rather than imported.
Sophisticated growing techniques have ensured
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high potency (often 20% THC) in the flowering
tops of the female plant which in turn achieves
maximum profits for criminal groups. Over the
past decade 'Growhouses' have become a feature
of daily drug seizures in Ireland. By 2012 a
cannabis cultivation facility was being discovered
by An Garda Síochána at a rate of one every two
days. The broad demand for cannabis herb has
meant that the Chinese and Vietnamese OCGs
were never destined to maintain the monopoly
on the cultivation market and Irish OCGs
eventually became involved (albeit to a smaller
scale). Profits from the Asian criminal enterprises
discovered are believed to have left the country
with little visible signs of wealth demonstrated by
the group leaders in Ireland. 
In Northern Ireland the number of cannabis
factories detected continues to be substantially
decreased compared to the same period last year.
This mirrors the UK wide trend of falling
numbers of detections. Whilst a reduction has
been noted in local production, facilities
uncovered continue to range from small,
haphazard cultivations for personal use, to large
scale, sophisticated cultivations linked to
established organised crime groups.
The most recent statistics published by the
Department of Health, Social Services and Public
Safety (October 2015) in relation to drugs misuse
in Northern Ireland indicates that a total of 2,262
clients presented to services for problem drug
misuse during 2014/15. Cannabis was used by
42% of clients as the main drug of misuse (an
increase of 39% compared to the previous
financial year). In a ten year period use of cocaine
by clients rose from 21% to 34%, while use of
ecstasy (27% to 13%) and heroin (16% to 11%)
both fell.
There has been an increase in the number of
seizures involving heroin and in the total amount
of heroin seized in Northern Ireland. Incidents of
seizures involving heroin have increased from 71
in the 2014/2015 financial year to 110 in
2015/2016; however, amounts seized suggest
that the heroin market within Northern Ireland
remains limited. There are, however, community
concerns about heroin and extensive work is
ongoing to protect the Northern Ireland public
from the threat posed by heroin. The PSNI are
conducting a number of proactive investigations
with regional, national and international
strands targeting the importation and supply of
heroin to NI.
A new opiate prevalence survey is currently
underway in the Republic of Ireland. This will
update current estimates which indicate that
there are between 18,000 and 23,000 heroin
users in the country. It is thought that in the
region of 15,000 of these are in Dublin. There
are 9,876 people on the central treatment list for
methadone in the ROI. Recent figures links
methadone to almost 113 drug related deaths in
10
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2011 which accounted for 56% of all poisoning
deaths for that year. 2014 figures show a
significant decrease in the number of times
heroin/morphine1 was mentioned in death
certificates in Northern Ireland (from 25 in 2013
to 11 in 2014); figures are not yet available for
20152.
The cocaine market in the Republic of Ireland has
declined significantly since its peak in 2007. This
is partly because of the economic climate that
followed this period and also because of the
cheap new range of white powders introduced to
mimic the effects of cocaine.  In 2014 there was
almost €7.5 million worth of cocaine seized in
the Republic of Ireland. This compares to €3.6
million in 2013, €30 million in 2012, €7.9
million in 2011, €7.9 million in 2010 and over
€132 million in 2009. Major seizures off the
Cork coastline in the last decade have been
significant because they have demonstrated that
Ireland was being favoured by global OCGs as a
transit hub for onward transportation of drugs to
third countries.
In Northern Ireland, the amount of cocaine
powder seized in the financial year 2015/2016
reduced dramatically compared to the previous
financial year; however, the numbers of cocaine
seizures have increased. This reduction is
primarily due to the seizure of approximately
50kg of cocaine in November 2014. To put this
seizure into context, over a three year period
from the financial year 2011/12 to the financial
year 2013/14, PSNI seized a total of
approximately 49kg of cocaine. Despite the fact
that the purity of cocaine on point of entry to the
country is higher than noted in previous years this
has not been reflected in purity levels at street
level. This, in part, is due to the successful
importation of mixing agents.
Crack cocaine has been a feature of the drug
market in the Republic of Ireland since 2006 but
it remains as a drug of misuse by users with a
principle heroin addiction. For this reason it has
not escalated to be a drug of epidemic proportion
in its own right. It has not as yet been noted in
N.I.
New psychoactive substances (NPS) or ‘legal
highs’ continue to present a significant problem
on both sides of the border. Surveys and data
provided by the European Monitoring Centre of
Drugs and Drugs Addiction (EMCDDA) and the
United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime
(UNODC) illustrate that ROI has the highest
prevalence rate with regard to New Psychoactive
Substances (NPS) in the European Union. A
2011 study showed 16% of 15 - 24 year olds
tried NPS which compared to an EU average of
just 5%. The EMCDDA is currently monitoring
443 NPS and many of these have appeared on
the Irish drug market. The most popular
substances have been white powder cathinones
and smokeable synthetic cannabanoids.
These drugs can be sold in liquid, powder and
tablet form and are consumed at parties or clubs
for their stimulant, mood altering and in some
cases, aphrodisiac effect.  However, it is generally
reported that these drugs can have serious side
effects both from a psychological and physical
viewpoint.  Such side effects include paranoia,
hallucinations (both auditory and visual),
gastrointestinal effects and kidney problems.
Young people are advised that there is no quality
control on these drugs.  There are problems with
purity and containments, and there is no way of
checking that what is purchased or consumed is
the intended substance, this can contribute to
overdose and ultimately drug related deaths.
In August 2010 the Criminal Justice
(Psychoactive Substances) Act became law in the
Republic of Ireland which effectively closed the
doors on 102 separate retail outlets known as
'Headshops'. In the preceding years the
'Headshop' industry flourished and introduced a
wave of NPS to young people who experimented
with these drugs often by virtue of the fact that
they were legal and available on the high street.
The first broad range of drugs to appear was the
party pill range containing Piperazines and more
specifically 1-Benzylpiperazine (BZP). At the
same time that BZP appeared in 2008 criminal
groups in the Netherlands found it difficult to
source PMK. As a result of this BZP and other
Piperazines replaced MDMA in the global ecstasy
1 Heroin (diamorphine) breaks down in the body into morphine therefore a combined figure must be given.
2 All statistics relating to deaths - from NISRA (April 2016).  “Drug related deaths and deaths due to drug misuse by sex and registration  
year, 2004-2014”. “Drug related deaths where selected substances were mentioned on the death certificate by registration year, 2004- 
2014”.
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market driving the market value down by 50% in
Ireland for a period which only ended in 2012
when MDMA started to reappear.
The Psychoactive Substances Act received Royal
Assent in the UK on 28 January 2016 and
enactment commenced in Northern Ireland on 26
May 2016. The Act prohibits the production,
distribution, sale and supply of psychoactive
substances, often incorrectly called “legal highs”.
It is hoped that the Act will reduce the supply of,
and demand for, these drugs.   
The Criminal Justice (Psychoactive Substances)
Act 2010 was very effective in shutting down the
Headshop industry overnight in Ireland but
unfortunately the reign of these outlets
introduced many young people to the world of
drug experimentation and today NPS share a
critical corner of the Irish drug market.
In January 2016 the Health Service Executive
(HSE) updated its warning to members of the
public (in the Republic of Ireland) and in
particular to young people following an incident
in Cork when six young people were admitted to
hospital following the ingestion of a psychoactive
substance.  Specifically the warning relates to the
2C family of psychedelic phenethylamine
designer drugs.  
Methamphetamine has been observed in the
Republic of Ireland for over 10 years but it has
maintained a relatively low prevalence. In the past
24 months four separate 'box labs' have been
discovered in Youghal, Co. Cork; Tralee, Co.
Kerry; Lusk, North Co. Dublin and in Dublin 8
where small scale methamphetamine production
had taken place.
In November 2013 pre-precursors including
Alphaphenylacetoacetonitrile (APAAN) and
Benzylcyanide were discovered in Ireland which
was an unexpected development. Despite these
seizures and a previous seizure of PMK and BMK
(the precursors to make MDMA and
Amphetamine) it is generally the case that
synthetic drug production does not occur in
Ireland save for the small scale
Methamphetamine conversion as described
above.
A number of Republic of Ireland based OCGs
have become involved in tabletting
pharmaceutical drugs. This involves sourcing Z
drugs such as Zopiclone and Zolpidem or
Benzodiazepines in powder form and then
making the tablets using custom made
equipment. The trade of medicinal products on
the illicit market continues to grow. The misuse
of drugs such as Alprazolam, Diazepam and
Flurazepam are not only a feature of the visible
illicit market but also have a noted prevalence in
society generally. 
There continues to be a significant amount of
prescription medication, namely diazepam, being
brought into Northern Ireland on a weekly basis.
Ongoing proactive operations are targeting this
issue along with an annual Interpol operation,
Operation PANGEA, targeting online sales of
prescription drugs on a global scale. Prescription
drugs3 continue to remain a concern as they
feature in over three times more death certificates
in Northern Ireland than heroin, cocaine,
amphetamines and mephedrone combined. Once
again, the internet facilitates suppliers and users
by making these drugs more accessible with a
lesser risk of detection.
Cross Border Activity
A number of Northern Ireland based OCGs
involved in drug related criminality are known to
have cross border links.
a. Priority OCGs (based on the level of harm
caused) are involved in the importation of 
drugs from the Republic of Ireland to 
Northern Ireland. This includes cannabis, 
cocaine and heroin.
b. There is collaboration between OCGs in 
both jurisdictions in the importation of 
drugs from Europe (and potentially further 
afield). These drugs cause harm on both 
sides of the border.
c. Northern Ireland OCGs have links with 
OCGs based in a number of cities across the
Republic of Ireland. 
d. Drugs are transported to Northern Ireland 
using a wide range of methods and vehicles.
This includes private vehicles (cars, 
motorcycles and vans), lorries, taxis, trains 
and buses. Often drugs are transported in 
relatively small amounts, however these 
importations occur regularly.
e. OCGs based in Northern Ireland are known
to use the Republic of Ireland as a transit 
route into Northern Ireland. Drugs are 
imported via ports (including Dublin) and 
then transported for distribution and sale in
Northern Ireland.
The following case studies provide an illustration
of collaboration between OCGs from both
jurisdictions.
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3 Figures relating to all benzodiazepines, tramadol, anti-depressants, paracetamol, codeine and dihydrocodeine.
On Tuesday 26th January 2016 two men were
arrested in the vicinity of an industrial estate in
Belfast when they were in the course of a drugs
handover.  Four large cardboard boxes were
located within a vehicle and each contained a large
number of plastic bags with suspect herbal
cannabis with an overall estimated street value of
£1 million. 
In a follow up home search in Drogheda, An
Garda Síochána recovered cannabis and cocaine
(combined value of £63,000).  Both individuals
were arrested, made admissions during interview
and were charged with possession of a class B
controlled drug, being concerned in the supply of
a class B controlled drug and possession of a class
B controlled drug with intent to supply.
Case Study 1
Operation SOLARO - This was a cross border
investigation into the alleged criminal activities of
an OCG who were assessed to be operating
throughout Ireland.  The group  were suspected of
cultivating cannabis on a major scale.  As a result
of timely communication and intelligence sharing
between AGS and PSNI, cannabis plants with an
estimated street value of £3 million were seized at
five locations in Northern Ireland and plants with
an estimated value of €750 seized in County
Meath.
Officers from the PSNI Reactive and Organised
Crime Branch arrested a total of 10 people during
the investigation with AGS arresting three
suspects in connection with their County Meath
seizure.  The majority were subsequently charged
with a number of drugs trafficking offences and
remanded in custody.
Case Study 2
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Routes
In terms of the origin of drugs that are misused in
Ireland there has also been some interesting
developments. Morocco still remains the source
country for all Cannabis resin. Synthetic drugs
(and semi synthetics) are manufactured in the
Netherlands and Heroin still comes across the
Balkan routes from Afghanistan. Now however,
China has become an important source country
in terms of NPS and India and Pakistan feature
prominently in relation to counterfeit medicines.
Republic of Ireland based OCGs are working at
an international scale as much as ever before with
Spain, Holland and the United Kingdom being
particularly relevant hubs for illegal activity
related to the importation of controlled drugs into
Ireland. Effective domestic legislation including
the Criminal Assets Bureau Act 1996, the
Criminal Justice (Mutual Assistance) Act 2008
and the Criminal Justice (Money Laundering and
Terrorist Financing) Act 2010 has made it more
difficult for Irish criminals to use or possess assets
in the Republic of Ireland. Enhanced international
cooperation in this regard is also serving to
frustrate criminal activity across many borders
which have become relevant to the Irish drugs
market. According to the Transcrime Organised
Crime Portfolio (OCP) report analysis shows that
moveable assets and in particular cash represents
the biggest share of confiscated goods between
2005 and 2012 in Ireland. OCGs have invested
in real estate, oil supply, companies, intangible
assets, vehicles and jewels. Criminal groups also
launder money through a range of legitimate and
non-legitimate enterprises including car sales
companies, the catering industry and online
betting. Analysis by the OCP indicates that
evidence clearly exists of criminal infiltration into
the legal economy.
5.2 Human Trafficking
Human Trafficking referrals in Northern Ireland
continue to increase year on year.  In the
2015/16 financial year the PSNI conducted 252
screening assessments; from these, 59 potential
victims of human trafficking were recovered in
Northern Ireland. This is an increase when
compared to the 46 potential victims recorded for
the financial year 2014/2015. In the Republic of
Ireland the extent of human trafficking had
remained static for a number of years, however
2015 has seen a considerable increase
particularly in the area of labour exploitation. The
trafficking of persons for the purpose of sexual
exploitation remains significantly high and the
abuse of the land border appears to be a major
factor in the area of both labour and sexual
exploitation.
In 2015 a total of 91 new human trafficking
investigations were initiated in the Republic of
Ireland. Four of these have been completed and
cannot be progressed; however 78 suspected
victims of human trafficking were identified in 62
of these investigations. This shows a major
increase in comparison with 46 victims identified
in 2014. This increase can be attributed in part to
the continued close liaison between An Garda
Síochána in partnership with State Agencies and
Civil Society in a continued programme of
training and awareness raising. The increase in
the number of victims of human trafficking for
sexual exploitation can be further attributed to
the fact that Operation QUEST works closely
with the Human Trafficking Investigation and
Coordination Unit.
The main issues for law enforcement continue to
centre on labour and sexual exploitation. Thirty
four of the 59 victims in Northern Ireland during
2015/2016 have been linked to labour
exploitation, 16 of whom were recovered in one
investigation involving the agricultural industry.
There has been a significant increase in the
number of victims identified for both sexual
exploitation and labour exploitation in the
Republic of Ireland. The number of victims
identified for sexual exploitation has increased
from 32 in 2014 to 48 in 2015. Labour
exploitation victims increased from seven in 2014
to 23 in 2015. Two people have been identified
as victims in 2015 for both sexual and labour
exploitation. The major increase in the number
of victims of labour exploitation is attributed in a
large part to targeted operations focusing on the
pop-up car washes which are being run by
Organised Crime Groups in Ireland. Eleven of the
victims identified for labour exploitation were
identified and rescued from these car washes.
There are currently a number of cross border
operations running, with PSNI officers working in
partnership with An Garda Síochána relating to
the investigation of human exploitation. These
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operations involving OCGs operating on both
sides of the border are suspected of trafficking
females into towns and cities across both the
Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland without
concern for the land border.
The key to the investigation of human trafficking
and controlled prostitution is the investigation of
the public web portals that are used to advertise
the ‘services’ of the victims and these
investigations have been successful in the
proactive and reactive investigations in previous
operations. The identification of potential victims
in relation to forced labour remains a challenging
area and recent operations have demonstrated
that the main suspects use the border as a
protection from law enforcement investigation.
One recent operation identified suspects living in
the Republic of Ireland who were enabling the
recruitment and exploitation of workers in
Northern Ireland. This has continued to frustrate
the investigation and whilst 16 victims of
trafficking were identified the abuse of the border
remains a key barrier preventing the immediate
arrest of the suspects.
The investigation of human trafficking remains a
priority. Whilst the demand remains in the labour
and sexual services sectors there is a market that
is being exploited by the OCGs. Effective cross
border investigation is crucial in the effective
detection of human trafficking affecting both
Northern Ireland and Ireland and this is a key area
for development.
5.3 Excise Fraud4 
Excise fraud across the Northern Ireland /
Republic of Ireland border is of major concern to
Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs in terms of
lost revenue. The border represents a risk
specifically in terms of oils and tobacco fraud due
to the nature of OCG activity, the ease with which
OCGs can conduct their business, and difficulties
in enforcing border controls.
Within Northern Ireland, the primary areas of
concern for law enforcement are Londonderry
and Armagh where inter-connected and well
established networks organise and facilitate
excise frauds.
Tobacco
Tobacco fraud typically involves the trade of;
a) Counterfeit tobacco products (both 
cigarettes and Hand Rolling Tobacco – 
HRT).
b) ‘Cheap White’ cigarettes which are 
manufactured legally overseas often in 
emerging economies where little regulation
exists, with the intent of being exported 
illegally to other countries via a smuggling 
network.
c) Illegal or smuggled non-duty paid tobacco 
products.
The lack of a physical border between the
Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland
facilitates tobacco smuggling with known OCGs
conducting smuggling activities, primarily the
movement of illicit cigarettes, but also according
to recent seizures, attempting the movement of
raw tobacco. 
The most commonly seen MO is of illicit tobacco
products smuggled in through Dublin Port both
in containers and in Ro-Ro freight. These
products originate primarily from the near
continent, however there have been seizures
relating to containers of product originating from
East Asia (Vietnam, Malaysia) into Dublin Port.
Seizures of cigarettes and HRT in Northern
Ireland have occurred both at Belfast Port and
Belfast International Airport. This traffic
originates primarily from within the EU, but in
some cases may have transited the UK.
Oils
Fuel fraud remains a major issue in Northern
Ireland. Illicit diesel was estimated to make up 8%
of the market share of diesel in Northern Ireland
in the year ended 31 March 2014, costing the
taxpayer around £50 million each year in lost
taxes. There has been a significant reduction in
the fraud since 2002/2003 when the illicit diesel
market share was estimated at 26%.
4 Information provided by Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs
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Both Governments are committed to tackling
fraud and close partnership working takes place
between UK and Irish law enforcement agencies
to tackle fuel related criminality. The UK and the
Republic of Ireland introduced a new fuel marker,
Accutrace™S10 in 2015.  A report on the new
marker was published after six months of
operation. The report showed a downward shift
in fuel supply ratios between Diesel and Marked
Gas Oil (MGO) across the UK and the Republic
of Ireland; a reduction in laundering plants
discovered; a fall in illegal use detected; and a
reduction in waste products associated with fuel
laundering. Although it is early days, the
emerging findings suggest a shift away from fuel
laundering by fraudsters. 
The impact of the marker continues to be
monitored. HMRC is keeping the fuel marker
under constant review and will take further action
if required as part of on-going efforts in the fight
against fuel fraud.
It is suspected that the introduction of the new
fuel marker will displace criminals into other
areas of oils fraud, or other types of criminality,
and HMRC is currently taking forward work to
identify if any displacement activity has occurred,
and if so what form this has taken.
Over the last year, HMRC and Irish Customs have
had an increasing focus on the emerging threat
posed by 'designer fuels'. These are fuels that
have had their chemical make-up changed, such
as by the addition of lubricants and biofuel blends
to diesel. Whilst the high diesel content of the
designer fuels makes it possible for them to be
used as road fuel, their make-up means that they
are classified as lubricants under specific Customs
Tariff (CN) codes.  As these tariff codes fall
outside the scope of intra-EU movement controls
(EMCS) the fuels may move across EU borders
without supervision, using only commercial
documentation. Excise fraudsters take advantage
of this to import these fuels with the intention of
putting them to road use, without payment of
excise duty. The issue of designer fuels is present
across Europe, but the high exchange rate of
Sterling to the Euro potentially makes the
purchasing of cheaper fuel in Eurozone countries
for subsequent use in the UK particularly
attractive.”
Alcohol
Alcohol fraud mainly occurs through excise duty
fraud, the smuggling of alcohol from countries
with lower alcohol tax rates and
production/distribution of counterfeit spirits. The
following modus operandi have been used for
Excise Diversion Fraud:
a) Mirror Loads – Multiple use of ARCs 
(excise movement documents)
b) Fraudulent receipt of consignments
c) Volume of products in excess of the 
declared amounts
d) Outward Diversion Fraud - A consignment
dispatched under duty suspension by a tax
warehouse in the State to another tax 
warehouse in another Member State with a
much lower excise duty rate than Ireland
During July 2016 two men were arrested in
connection with a joint investigation by HM
Revenue and Customs (HMRC), the Police Service
of Northern Ireland (PSNI) and the Revenue
Commissioners, into the importation and
distribution of suspected illicit fuel.
The men, one aged 49 from the Newry area and
one aged 20 from County Louth in the Republic
of Ireland, were interviewed by HMRC and were
released on bail. Investigations are continuing.
HMRC officers seized 26,000 litres of oil at a fuel
supply company in County Armagh on 30 June
with a further 130,000 litres seized at Belfast
docks. The seized fuel is believed to be a mixture
of industrial lubricant and diesel. 
Case Study 3
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Separately, there are also a number of methods
adopted to smuggle alcohol: 
a) Removal from the duty suspended system 
and onward supply
b)Smuggling of alcohol from countries with 
lower alcohol taxes
c) Under declaring the quantities of alcohol 
purchased from other Member States
d) Irish Traders selling alcohol without 
payment of excise duty or having the 
required Excise licence to deal in alcohol 
trading
Inward diversion (the abuse of duty suspended
alcohol movements) continues to offer the
maximum profit to risk ratio for OCGs and
provides a method to move large volumes. It
therefore remains the greatest revenue risk within
alcohol fraud with OCGs suspected to be
continuing to abuse duty suspension rules to
move multiple loads of alcohol under a single
electronic administrative document. This type of
fraud is prevalent among Irish OCGs as seized
alcohol has entered both Northern Ireland and
the Republic of Ireland through Belfast and
Dublin Ports.
There is information to suggest abuse of the Irish
Excise Duty Entry (EDE) system to divert alcohol
from Poland into the UK in addition to the more
traditional methods and routes.
An internal review by the Revenue
Commissioners of the Alcohol Products Tax
Regime (in the Republic of Ireland) was
completed in March 2015. The incidence and
experience of alcohol fraud formed part of this
review. Evidence of large scale alcohol fraud or
EMCS fraud (Excise Movement Control System
for duty suspended product) was not found by
this review.
The Intellectual Property Crime Unit (IPCU)
attached to the National Bureau of Criminal
Investigation liaises with FSAI and Revenue
Commissioners as part of Operation OPSON, a
global initiative by Interpol and Europol to tackle
sub-standard and counterfeit food and beverage
products being sold to the general public. 
In a global context, the Republic of Ireland
participated in Operation OPSON for the first
time in 2014 (Operation OPSON IV). Ireland has
subsequently participated in OPSON V in 2015
and OPSON VI is due to take place in late 2016
and early 2017. A meeting is scheduled in
October 2016  to outline the parameters for
OPSON VI. 
As a result of inter-agency cooperation a number
of persons have been identified as targets in
relation to the sale of counterfeit alcohol. As a
result of this cooperation a Food Fraud Task
Force has been established to meet on a regular
basis to identify suspects and discuss the targeting
of criminals involved in the sale and supply of
counterfeit foods and beverages to unsuspecting
members of the public.
Currently there are a number of enquiries
ongoing between FSAI, Revenue & Customs,
AGS and the PSNI in relation to the illegal sale
and supply of counterfeit alcohol in the border
region. In 2014, a confidential report was made
to FSAI that a man in a white Mercedes van
approached a publican in Dublin and offered to
sell him vodka at a reduced price. The van owner
was identified as a person from Co. Monaghan
who was suspected of supplying counterfeit
alcohol to publicans on both sides of the border.
Enquiries are ongoing on both sides of the border
in relation to this case.
A number of persons have been discovered by
FSAI advertising Smirnoff vodka and wine for sale
on Facebook and the Internet: In November 2014
FSAI searched a premises under warrant and
found counterfeit vodka. The suspect identified
the persons who supplied her counterfeit alcohol.
Both of these persons were known to Garda
members on the search as persons involved in
criminality. Currently enquiries are ongoing into
the activities of these criminals in relation to the
sale and supply of counterfeit alcohol.
FSAI has identified a group involved in the sale
and supply of counterfeit wine and spirits online
and linked to Facebook. The main suspect runs a
courier business from a Business Park. In July
2014, he shipped a pallet of counterfeit wine to
Co. Cork. This was intercepted and seized.
Analysis has proved that the wine was counterfeit
and had a lower alcohol content than stated on
the bottles. Enquiries are ongoing into this OCG.
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On 6th July 2015 a midlands Garda stopped a car
in Mullingar driven by a local criminal in Co.
Westmeath. In the vehicle the Garda member
found 39 bottles of Smirnoff Vodka and 64
bottles of Glens Vodka. A subsequent analysis
conducted by FSAI found that these bottles were
counterfeit and the Vodka contained in them was
counterfeit also. Enquiries are ongoing in relation
to the information and evidence found in the
above cases to establish the source of the
counterfeit alcohol being supplied and sold to
unsuspecting members of the public. 
In recent times the supply of counterfeit alcohol
has diminished and this may be due to Dundalk
Gardai locating a Bottling Plant on 1st December
2015 at a premises in Co. Louth. This discovery
was part of Operation Scale and appears to have
severely disrupted the supply of counterfeit
alcohol to the criminals involved in this
enterprise. 
5.4 Cybercrime
By its very nature, Cybercrime as a pernicious
threat operates seamlessly across International
borders and nationals and residents of multiple
states can engage in criminal acts together and
remotely. These criminal relationships are not
unique to the UK and Republic of Ireland as a
specific ‘cross-border’ matter. Nor unique is the
manner by which cyber criminals benefit from
differing legal frameworks across jurisdictions,
especially those relating to service provision
around the likes of hosting services.5
NCA report that the overseas-based element of
the cybercrime threat to the UK emanates
primarily from an elite set of highly professional,
well-co-ordinated criminals operating mainly
from Russia and Eastern Europe and inflicting
major harm on the UK and other economies.
There are also significant elements of the threat
based in the UK and a vibrant cyber criminal
marketplace which, by acting as a trading
platform for information and services, continues
to lower the bar to criminals in any location to
access increasingly sophisticated tools and
techniques.
Cyber Crime continues to evolve and develop in
what was once an emerging threat area but is now
a daily response for policing. Individual members
of the community continue to be attacked in a
wide range of areas including blackmail and cyber
enabled fraud incidents, identity thefts and other
financially or sexually motivated crimes. The
targeted and devastating attacks on business and
industry across Ireland continue to give cause for
concern in network intrusions (hacking), in
malware deployments again business targeting
fraud and theft of financial details and data. The
impact of such attacks can have devastating and
catastrophic effects in business and industry and
the impact is not only on the reputational aspect
of the company but on the economy of Northern
Ireland as a whole impacting on inward
investment, employment and growth. Recently
OCGs have targeted business and industry across
Ireland and Northern Ireland in a co-ordinated
blackmail campaign. This demonstrates the cross
border attacks that require an effective cohesive
response. 
An Garda Síochána report the following specific
areas of concern: 
a) Malware continues to be utilised by 
criminals to hack computers, steal 
information and facilitate the creation of 
computer networks which in turn are 
utilized in further criminal campaigns. 
b)There is also a continued growth in 
Ransomware and the public have recently 
reported infections using Tesla Crypt 3.0, 
Locky and Zepto. This malware encrypts an
individual's computer and the criminals seek
a payment usually in Bitcoin to unencrypt 
the data.
c) We continue to see a growth in the number
of Distributed Denial of Service ( DDoS) 
attacks against government and financial 
institutions. Those responsible for these 
attacks include hactivists. We have also 
observed the continued reporting of 
extortion by way of DDoS by groups such 
as DD4BC, the Armada Collective and the 
Lizzard Squad.
5 Information provided by the National Crime Agency
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A number of International Revenue Share
Fraud/PBX frauds are reported regularly to An
Garda Síochána. Gardaí continue to promote
awareness in relation to cybercrime by speaking
at various events and have participated at the
Organised Crime Task Force (OCTF)
Cybercrime Group meeting held at Stormont in
December.
A key concern is  the development of cyber
enabled tactics by existing and developing OCGs
working across Ireland. The use of the ‘darknet’
is not only facilitating the supply of drugs,
firearms and other illegal commodities but
‘services’ are also becoming available for hire to
enable OCGs to utilise the cyber environment
without any prior knowledge, skill or experience.
Recent operations have demonstrated the need
for a cohesive cyber cross border response to
proactively investigate the use of these ‘services
for hire’ being utilised in traditional crime across
both jurisdictions.
The last and most challenging area of cyber is the
forensic and technical support to traditional
investigations. Historically this involved the
seizure and removal of IT systems from suspects’
addresses or locations. But, with the increasing
use of encryption and cloud services, there is
need to proactively deploy technical and forensic
officers to conduct live data examinations (live
data analysis)   on scene whilst systems are open
and accessible. This use of live data forensics has
already provided vital evidence in many cases and
development of this through investment in
training and infrastructure is a key area for the
increased capability and enhancement of cyber
investigations across all areas of organised and
serious crime.
Cyber technical, forensic and investigative
support touches on all areas of crime
investigation and there is a need to continue the
enhancement of skills and capability in this area
if we care to defeat the criminals’ use of IT as an
enabler. The continued development of
encryption and secure communication and
accessible cloud services continues to frustrate
law enforcement evidence gathering and if we are
to have a realistic opportunity for effective
investigation we must continue to develop this
law enforcement skill.
5.5 Environmental/Waste Crime6
What is Waste Crime
Waste crime is the collection, transport,
processing, export or disposal of waste outside
licensed activity or authorisations. When waste is
not handled legitimately, it can potentially cause
harm to human health and the environment. The
unlicensed activity also has the potential to
undermine legitimate business and deprive the
government of tax income.
The Legitimate Economy
A report produced by the Environmental Services
Association Education Trust (ESAET) in March
2014 refers to the UK economy as a whole and
states that “while waste crime can have serious
environmental impacts, the motive is economic.
It offers high rewards and relatively low risk of
substantial penalty. It takes work away from
legitimate, permitted waste operators, who
therefore lose income. However, the profits come
largely at the expense of the taxpayer. The Table
below shows that the annual costs of illegal waste
Activity
Illegal Waste Sites
Tax Evasion
Fly-tipping
TOTAL
Cost Range (£m/yr)
126.9 – 224.3
93.7 – 314.0
103.2 – 270.0
323.8 – 808.3
323.8 – 808.3
Best Estimate (£m/yr)
126.9 – 224.3
93.7 – 314.0
103.2 – 270.0
567.9
Table : Costs of Waste Crime to the UK economy
6  Northern Ireland Environment Agency (NIEA) – Strategic Assessment – Environmental Crime (October 2015)
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sites, fly-tipping and Landfill Tax evasion each
exceed £100m per year.”
Whether it is the loss of revenue to HM Revenue
and Customs or the money spent in clearing up,
the tax-payer ultimately shoulders the burden of
the costs of these illegal sites – resources that
could have been spent on vital services.
The Threat
Organised criminality
There is a level of organisation to all major waste
crime and its driver is financial gain – this meets
the strict definition of organised crime and
therefore the assessment is that organised waste
crime is pervasive.
In March 2016, the Northern Ireland
Environment Agency (NIEA) liaised with PSNI on
their current enforcement cases.
PSNI’s assessment of the defendants (relating to
waste crime) is:
− None had known (current) paramilitary links
(although one has historic Republican 
traces).
− Offenders frequently involved in other types
of organised crime either use the waste 
industry as a means to legitimise the 
proceeds of crime, or include waste crime as
an ‘add on’ to an existing criminal 
enterprise.
− Crime types engaged in include fuel 
laundering/smuggling, drug supply, theft 
and fraud.
At the end of August 2016, the Environmental
Crime Unit was dealing with a total of 70 ongoing
cases. It has been estimated that a total of
1,726,799 tonnes of waste has been illegally
dumped across these cases. A sizeable proportion
(1,165,155 tonnes) relates to one high profile
criminal case in Londonderry. The criminal
benefit (based on the 2016/17 higher rate of
landfill tax of £84.40 per tonne) for these cases
is £145.7 million (£98 million from the high
profile case in Londonderry).
Financial rewards
Waste is a valuable commodity and those
involved in the collection, transport, processing
and disposal can earn money in a legitimate way.
However, when offenders carry out activity
outside authorisations, they stand to make
significant financial gain in the following ways: 
a) Illegal Dumping - by criminals and 
legitimate businesses (who are operating 
outside their license, permit or exemption).
For example, a Co Down man who had 
previously been made the subject of a 
£108,350 confiscation order under the 
Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 was 
sentenced to 18 months imprisonment. He
was depositing and keeping waste on his 
land which is in contravention of Articles 
4(1)(a), 4(1)(b) and 4(1)(c) of the Waste and
Contaminated Land (NI) Order 1997. No 
waste management licence existed for this 
site, on which investigating officers from 
NIEA found around 2,000 tonnes of mixed
waste.
b)Mis-classification of Waste – to avoid higher
disposal fees or to export potentially 
hazardous material under the guise of inert
waste to hide the true nature of this waste.
Intelligence received into NIEA suggests 
that skip companies are bringing standard 
waste to a landfill site where the higher rate
of £84.40 per tonne should apply. However,
there is a practice of ‘top-dressing’ taking 
place where the standard waste is covered 
by a layer of inert waste – e.g. soil and 
stones – making it appear that the 
(2016/17) lower rate of £2.65 per tonne 
should apply to the entire load. The skip 
companies are defrauding HMRC of more 
than £80 per tonne with each load of ‘top-
dressed’ waste. It is very difficult for 
regulators to prove that this activity takes 
place onsite and therefore the exact value 
of the loss of revenue is not known; 
however, the example overleaf outlines this
loss if just one lorry-load per day deposits
misclassified waste at each of the landfill 
sites.
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Harm to Human Health and the
Environment
The degradation of materials in these
unauthorised landfills can lead to the production
of hydrogen sulphide which damages the nervous
and respiratory systems when inhaled. The
leachate produced from these materials can also
damage soils and local water courses. 
Cross Border Activity7 
Liaison between NIEA and PSNI has highlighted
an emerging trend where dumped waste has
originated in the Republic of Ireland. 
NIEA assess that Northern Ireland is being used
as a ‘corridor’ to transport controlled waste from
ROI to Scotland without notifying the relevant
authorities. The risk is that the authorities do not
know what is being transported across borders. 
An Garda Síochána is represented on the
National Waste Enforcement Steering Committee
by the National Bureau of Criminal Investigation.
The committee was set up in 2015 by the
Department of Environment, Community and
Local Government to oversee the work of new
Waste Enforcement Regional Lead Authorities
(WERLAs). The membership is drawn from
regulatory bodies with a link to waste crime and
£80            – loss of revenue for 1 tonne of misclassified waste
20 tonnes   – the capacity of one lorry-load
30               – number of open landfill sites
5               – days of the week
50              – working weeks in the year
=   potential £12.5million per annum in lost revenue
Example
In November 2015 NIEA launched an operation in response to reports that waste originating from the
Republic of Ireland (ROI) was buried in a number of sites in County Tyrone. Initially, two sites were reported.
Subsequently other sites were identified with buried waste from the ROI. Waste including food packaging,
tetra packs, electrical items, baled plastics, dry and domestic recyclables and clinical waste was discovered.
Waste was linked to a number of locations across ROI, including Tipperary, Kerry, Clare, Limerick, Cork,
Galway, Dublin and Longford.
So far, the amount of waste uncovered is approximately 30,000 tonnes. With the 2016/17 higher rate of
landfill tax at £84.40 per tonne, the criminal benefit is believed to be at least £2,532,000.
It is perceived that waste crime is a low risk, high reward activity with little or no chance of being identified
and convicted.
Case Study 4
7 Northern Ireland Environment Agency (NIEA) 
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the objective is that the national committee will
embed an inter-agency approach at a national
level and that this inter-agency approach will filter
down and be replicated at a regional and local
level in the management of Waste/Environmental
criminality. Each agency will continue to
discharge its own existing functions. The
interagency approach provides an opportunity to
accomplish this in a complimentary nature to
each other.
Each representative on the Committee has
undertaken to act as a contact point at national
level and feed requests from the WERLAs
through their respective organisations. An Garda
Síochána is committed to assisting regulatory
agencies in combating environmental criminality
and where specific operations are planned and
assistance from An Garda Síochána anticipated,
a business case will be prepared which An Garda
Síochána’s representative will present to Senior
Garda management in order that a decision on
assistance and/or resources will be made
available.
The NWESC meets four to five times a year and
the next meeting is scheduled for 18th October
2016. At a meeting of the Committee on 27th
January 2016, Chaired by the Principal Officer,
Department of Environment, Community and
Local Government, it was agreed that the specific
topic of emerging illegal waste deposited in
Northern Ireland from this jurisdiction needed a
multi-agency approach with a view towards
tackling it quickly and effectively. With that in
mind, a task force, headed by the Dublin Regional
Authority would commence an investigation into
these emerging threats. An Garda Síochána,
through its representative, expressed its
willingness and availability to support the
investigation.
5.6 Criminal Finances / Money
Laundering
Financial gain is a major motivator of most, if not
all, serious and organised criminal activities of
which money laundering is a natural
consequence. While there are no confirmed
figures for the scale of money laundering,
estimates by the International Monetary Fund, in
keeping with those of the United Nations and
Financial Action Task Force would suggest that
the scale of money laundering impacting upon
the UK would be in the region of GBP 36 billion
to GBP 90 billion.8
Organised criminal groups need to launder the
proceeds of their criminality in order to make it
appear legitimate. In the past few years a number
of new money laundering methodologies have
been identified in Northern Ireland. These have
included:9
a) The use of gift cards – Law enforcement can
seize cash where they have reason to believe
it has been criminally obtained. The seizing
of store gift cards can be somewhat more 
complex. PSNI previously identified a 
money laundering methodology whereby 
criminally obtained cash was being 
transferred onto store gift cards before 
being converted into other commodities and
then back into cash. It should be noted that
this methodology was complicated and time
consuming, as the commodities had to be 
sold in order to gain cash back again. This 
type of laundering technique has the 
potential to minimise risk to the OCG 
through evading detection and indeed 
increases the profit made by these groups. 
If this is not managed properly however it 
may result in significant losses to the group.
An Garda Síochána are not aware of the 
widespread use of gift cards to launder 
funds in the ROI.
b)The use of digital currencies, electronic 
transfer systems, cash vouchers and pre pay
cards – This threat has been noted on both
sides of the border. In the past OCGs 
would have physically moved cash across 
borders in order to reduce the risk of 
scrutiny when using financial institutions. 
Whilst this is still the case, there are now an
increasingly wide variety of ways of 
transferring cash between jurisdictions 
without using ‘traditional’ financial 
institutions. Many of these facilities are not
easily traced and allow money to be ‘loaded’
8 Information provided by the National Crime Agency
9 Information provided by Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs
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in one jurisdiction and withdrawn in another
in quick time. Examples used by locally 
based organised crime groups include 
Bitcoin, Western Union, uKash, Coinstar, 
Money Gram and prepaid MasterCard and
Visa cards. In 2015 an individual was 
convicted of Drug Trafficking offences in the
Republic of Ireland. In this case it was 
identified that the suspect was using virtual
currencies (not solely Bitcoin).
c) The use of cash businesses – Some 
businesses lend themselves more readily to
money laundering as they deal mostly with
cash. Organised crime groups sometimes 
use these businesses to hide criminally 
obtained money alongside legitimate profits.
This may seem like a relatively easy way to
launder money however, since the 
introduction of the Proceeds of Crime Act 
(POCA) in NI, staff at financial institutions 
are trained to recognise and report ‘unusual’
transactions and this includes unusual 
movements of cash through business 
accounts. This method of laundering is often
managed by the use of a professional 
facilitator, such as an accountant.
d)Physical movement of cash across borders 
– Some organised crime groups still favour
this method. They will often use ‘mules’ to 
carry out this activity. In some instances the
cash is moved through the postal system. 
The large number of local bank notes in 
circulation in Northern Ireland can make 
this practice more difficult as the criminal 
group will often have to change the cash 
into Euro or Bank of England Sterling notes
prior to moving it. In a 2015 report “Why 
Cash is Still King” Europol estimated that in
excess of 1.5 Billion Euro is detected and/or
seized by Competent Authorities each year.
e) Layering the profits through a number of 
accounts – Organised criminals may try to 
avoid detection by placing smaller amounts
through a large number of accounts, often 
in other people’s names. This can be a risky
choice for the criminal as it widens the circle
of people involved in their criminality, 
making them more vulnerable to 
identification by law enforcement.
f) The use of money service businesses 
(MSBs) – Northern Ireland bank notes can 
be undesirable for those wishing to 
purchase criminal commodities outside the
country. Criminally complicit MSBs offer a 
‘no questions asked’ currency exchange 
facility which is attractive to organised 
criminals. Money laundering by complicit 
currency exchange MSBs has traditionally 
taken place in London and Northern 
Ireland, with OCGs from elsewhere in the 
UK and/or Europe travelling to exchange 
money. Northern Ireland appears 
particularly attractive to this due to its land
border with the Republic of Ireland, which 
has the Euro as its currency, and the 
continued availability of the €500 note. 
Money will be changed into sterling or 
Euros depending on whether transactions 
for illicit goods are being made in Northern
Ireland, the Republic or the UK mainland.
Law enforcement agencies in Northern 
Ireland continue to investigate the criminal
use of MSBs in co-operation with An Garda
Síochána where appropriate. Joint 
investigations have highlighted complicit 
MSBs linked to criminality such as drugs 
supply and cigarette smuggling, in some 
instances involving the processing of 
millions of pounds.
g) Property and land purchase – Many 
organised criminals have invested 
criminally-obtained profits in property and 
land. Property in the United Kingdom, 
Republic of Ireland and also Eastern Europe
has been popular; however the recession 
has led to many of these properties losing 
much of their value. It should be noted 
however that the rental market remains 
buoyant and many criminals who put their 
money into property became involved in the
buy-to-let sector with a view to long term 
investment. Given the high degree of 
negative equity that is being seen across this
sector, property portfolios continue to be a
popular and effective method of concealing
the proceeds of crime and, in the medium 
to long term, will represent a significant 
investment. This is particularly true when 
mortgage payments continue to be serviced
by rental income. Throughout the money 
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laundering process organised crime groups 
will often enlist the help of corrupt 
professionals, such as accountants, 
solicitors and banking officials. These 
‘professional facilitators’, sometimes 
referred to as ‘gatekeepers’, can provide a 
range of services and whilst some may do 
so unknowingly, others will be fully aware 
of their clients’ involvement in organised 
crime. Even those who are genuinely not 
aware of their clients’ involvement may 
have acted illegally or irresponsibly by not 
showing due diligence in the execution of 
their duties.
NCA assess trade based money laundering
(TBML) to have been a growth area across the UK
in recent years, primarily through incorporated
companies with limited liabilities; in which
business structures are used to launder criminal
proceeds through the trade in real or imaginary
goods or services both domestically and
internationally.
Criminals using TBML may also seek to minimise
their tax costs by using international trade or
goods and services which do not attract VAT or
other charges. This has been evidenced in
particular with the use of wholesale clothing
companies by controller networks across Europe
to move criminal proceeds. Other trade sectors
are also known to have been used for this
purpose, including vehicle companies.
The management of the movement of cash, and
goods through the trading companies and within
cash pools, is carried out by international
controllers who are professional money
launderers with a network of collectors and
businesses under their command. It is probable
that such ‘International controllers’ are active via
local collectors and consolidator networks on
both sides of the Northern Ireland / Republic of
Ireland border.
5.7 Extortion
The Threat
Personal blackmails against individuals
investigated by PSNI in the past year have
included those committed by locally based
organised crime groups and also those specialising
in web-based extortion, sometimes based
overseas.  ‘Protection racket’ type offences
continue.  These involve the extorting of money
from a business in exchange for ‘protection
services’, with the threat of violence against the
business owner/staff/family or damage to
property if the payments are not made.  In the past
in Northern Ireland these types of attack were
often used to raise funds for paramilitary groups,
for personal financial gain of members, and to
exert authority over local communities.  More
recently some of the organised crime groups
involved in this type of activity have maintained
links to paramilitary groups, however it is often
not clear whether the actions have been
sanctioned by senior members.  Some organised
criminals will use the name of a paramilitary group
in order to threaten a business, however any
money extorted will ultimately be for personal
gain. Both loyalist and republican paramilitary
groups have been involved in extortion.
In addition to extortion attempts against business
owners, so-called ‘bad on bad’ extortions are also
seen in Northern Ireland.  These involve the
blackmailing of an individual involved in some
form of criminality, most frequently drug supply.
It is often described as a form of ‘tax’.  Those
claiming to be from dissident republican groups
are particularly active in this area, however
individuals claiming to be from loyalist
paramilitary groups are also implicated.  As with
other types of extortion, it is not always clear
whether senior leaders within the named
paramilitary groups have actually sanctioned the
extortion attempt and how much of the money
raised, will be used for terrorist financing or for
personal gain.
5.8 Mobile OCGs
There are a number of mobile organised crime
groups operating throughout the island of Ireland.
These groups are involved in carrying out
burglaries of commercial and residential
properties. They often target the most vulnerable
members of society. 
There is considerable evidence that the border
plays a significant role in domestic burglary in
Northern Ireland, not just in the border counties
as would be expected, but right across the
Province.
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Cross border burglary has been an issue for many
years, but recent trends have highlighted the
extent of the involvement of OCGs involved in
domestic burglary. The border is an important
factor in these offences with criminal groups from
the Republic of Ireland travelling into Northern
Ireland to commit crimes and vice versa.
Intelligence would suggest Northern Ireland
based groups are involved in intelligence
gathering and victim identification for groups
based across the border.
This has been particularly apparent in the last
eighteen months. Travelling criminals from the
ROI have been involved in a sustained series of
domestic burglaries in Northern Ireland, mainly
across Belfast City and South Area.  These
include creeper burglaries targeting high value
vehicles, (a number of which have been recovered
across the border), burglaries specifically
targeting the elderly, distraction burglaries and
burglaries where Asian victims have been
targeted.  Vehicles, cash and high value jewellery
are generally the only items stolen, with other
valuables such as electronics bypassed.  Even
firearms are not routinely stolen, and there are
numerous examples of gun cabinets being broken
into and the firearms left behind as money was
the target. 
During 2015 there was a series of up to 200
domestic burglaries linked to one travelling OCG
(with cases in both NI and the ROI), These
offences (mostly distraction burglaries) were
targeted against older people.  Members of this
group used a large number of vehicles in the
commission of these crimes. This included several
stolen high performance cars. This group was
extremely professional and forensically aware.
A number of groupings have bases on both sides
of the Border and cross freely back and forward,
exploiting the fact that there are two different
police services, exploiting difficulties in
information sharing and joined up intelligence –
for instance they utilise different addresses and
dates of birth, causing confusion. It is assessed
that the majority of the jewellery stolen in NI is
taken across the border to the ROI for disposal,
again making recovery less likely.
Travelling criminals from the Dublin area were
previously involved in a series of high value
domestic burglaries targeting the Chinese
community right across Northern Ireland.  They
utilise ringer plates on high value cars and are
highly professional.  In approximately eight
months there were over 85 burglaries targeting
Chinese victims and an unknown number of
linked burglaries. Safes from a number of these
burglaries have been recovered just across the
Border. This is further evidence that property
stolen in Northern Ireland is transported across
the border for disposal.
In Londonderry in 2015 there were numerous
daytime domestic burglaries targeting cash and
jewellery – criminals from the Dublin area were
suspected of involvement in this series – this
demonstrates the lengths that some OCGs will
travel to commit crime.
The sum of money stolen by these groups is
significant – in the Chinese series alone in excess
of £400,000 cash and many tens of thousands of
pounds worth of jewellery have been stolen in the
last eight months.  This money is often converted
into new luxury vehicles.
There has also been a sustained series of high
value 4X4 vehicles stolen in South Armagh going
back over two years.  Toyota Hi Lux and Land
Cruisers are particularly targeted, with a very low
recovery rate. The criminals involved are believed
to live in Northern Ireland, but exploit the border
to move stolen vehicles.
It is difficult to get an accurate overview of all
crimes linked to such groups when their crimes
straddle the border, meaning investigative
opportunities can potentially be overlooked.
In May 2016 the PSNI in South Area launched a
dedicated operation targeting Cross Border
travelling burglary groups.  As a result, there were
11 arrests and four cars seized as being involved
in burglary during May.  In one incident, five
members of one Dublin-based crime family were
arrested in a single vehicle as they were about to
engage in another burglary spree.  This proactive
approach by police has resulted in a significant
reduction in domestic burglary in South Area in
the months since.
The Garda Commissioner launched Operation
THOR, the National Anti-Crime Strategy, on 2nd
November 2015.  The operation was set up to
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tackle burglary and related crimes based on
analysis of crime trends and patterns. Since the
beginning of the operation on a national level, the
number of burglaries has decreased by 34% in
comparison to the previous year. The success of
Operation THOR is built on enhanced policing
activity across multiple strands including high
visibility patrols and checkpoints supported by
number plate recognition technology, case
management of prolific offenders, tailored victim
support services, effective inter-agency
partnerships and the national “Lock Up, Light Up”
advertising campaign. To date the Operation has
led to the arrest of 2,102 individuals and there
have been 30,062 patrols and 38,567 checkpoints
nationally.  An Garda Síochána is currently
expanding the focus of Operation THOR to
include preventing crimes against the person,
enhancing community safety and preventing
incidents of public disorder.
An Garda Síochána launched Operation BISTRO
in 2014 to provide a focused, intelligence led,
approach to identifying and disrupting criminals
specifically targeting restaurant and take away
owners, mainly within the Asian community. These
offences were also occurring in Northern Ireland.  
The home addresses of these business owners are
targeted by criminals for residential burglaries due
to the belief they may contain safes/large volumes
of cash.  The operation covers (and burglaries have
been recorded in) all Garda regions; whilst prior to
2014 all incidents occurred outside of the Dublin
region, since 2014 the majority of burglaries occur
in the Dublin Metropolitan Region.  The number
of associated burglaries peaked in late 2014 and
has declined since that time.  There were 25
incidents linked to the operation in October and
November 2014 alone.  During the calendar year
2015, there were a total of 22 Op Bistro
associated burglaries with property to a total value
of around €300,000 stolen.  Information suggests
a significant degree of planning and organisation
in the commission of these offences which
primarily target cash and jewellery.  Up to three
OCGs were believed to have been involved with
these offences, though these are interconnected
by a small number of individuals.
5.9 Rural / Agricultural crime10 
Definition of Rural Crime – covers all burglary,
robbery and theft offences in a geographical area
based on an aggregation of settlement bands.
Crimes are allocated based on available postcode
information.
Recent incidents and press coverage indicate
there are a number of OCGs involved in crime
types traditionally seen in rural locations,
including fuel laundering, plant theft, organised
livestock theft, waste crime and food fraud.  
These groups can move from one crime type to
another depending on Police activity, for example
individuals involved in waste crime moving into
plant theft and then ATM theft.  These organised
crime groups can, in some instances, pose
significant challenges for intelligence gathering as
they often operate in locations which have
traditionally posed difficulties for police.  
Agricultural Crime
Definition of Agricultural Crime – Agricultural
crime covers all burglary, robbery and theft
offences where the property and/or vehicles
stolen have an agricultural link (e.g. farm
equipment, agricultural vehicles, livestock etc.) or
where the crime location was agricultural (e.g.
farm, farmhouse).
In September 2015 the home of the owner of a
Chinese Restaurant in Fermanagh was burgled.
Electrical goods were bypassed and £10000 and
€7500 were stolen.  Police were given the
description of a vehicle with false plates making
off from the scene and later that evening two
vehicles were stopped by AGS in Cavan.
Paperwork from the burglary and £20,000 in cash
were recovered.  Two arrests were made –
travelling criminals originally from the Dublin area
who had recently been living in Fermanagh, and a
third suspect, also from the Dublin area, made off.
Case Study 5
10 Figures on urban and rural crime are based on a geographically-based definition from the Report of the Inter-Departmental Urban-
Rural Definition Group February 2005, using settlement bands grouped into urban or rural. Please note that not all agricultural crime
will occur in a rural settlement.
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Figures for Agricultural Crime (in Northern
Ireland) have fallen from 937 crimes in 2010/11
to 706 in 2014/15.
Agricultural crime, unsurprisingly occurs
overwhelmingly in rural areas, with 685 of the
706 crimes in 2014/15 occurring in rural areas.
The cost of agricultural crime is punctuated with
peaks and troughs in the period between 2011-
2014.  This is assessed from the value of claims
paid through the National Farmers Union Mutual
(NFU Mutual).  In 2012 the cost was £3.4million.
In 2013 the cost had risen by 15% to £3.9million
(25% increase in livestock claims).  In 2014 the
cost fell significantly to £2.4million, though by
contrast the cost in 2014 in Wales was
£1.7million and in Scotland £1.8million.  Figures
for 2015 are not yet available, though it is
assessed that there is unlikely to be a significant,
if any, increase on 2014.
The decrease in 2014 is attributed to the
implementation of a range of initiatives by PSNI
and UFU, including the launch of schemes such
as “Farmwatch”, initially launched in Fermanagh
in April 2012 and now operating service wide.
The Scheme includes:
a) DNA marking on machines and tools
b)Unique number for all farm machinery
c) A property marking scheme
d)Machinery and tool assets register
e) A road sign ‘Farm Watch’
f) A Business Watch telephone alert system
g) Practical crime prevention advice
A Trailer Marking Scheme was also launched in
April 2012 and now operates across all PSNI
Districts. This has also had a positive impact on
thefts of farm trailers and horseboxes.
In the border region the theft of livestock and the
smuggling of animals has been a concern for a
number of years. In the Republic of Ireland An
Garda Síochána liaises and works closely with the
Food Safety Authority of Ireland (FSAI) and the
Department of Agriculture, Food and the Marine
(DAFM) in tackling the theft of livestock in the
border region. 
TheftStop is a farm theft prevention initiative that
has been developed by the Irish Farmer’s
Association (IFA) in partnership with An Garda
Síochána. TheftStop empowers farmers to take a
proactive approach to protect their farm
equipment. Registered members are provided
with a unique security ID, which they use to mark
their machinery and equipment both overtly and
covertly and then upload an image of their
equipment to the TheftStop website.
A comprehensive database of all stolen
equipment is available for TheftStop members to
view on-line. TheftStop also communicates with
members when there is a theft of farm
equipment/machinery to increase awareness.
Before purchasing used equipment, members can
check the database to make sure that the item(s)
are not listed as stolen.
This is one of many of the IFA’s initiatives to
improve rural security in Ireland. It is co-
ordinated by the IFA and the Rural Crime
Prevention Executive in conjunction with An
Garda Síochána. More information is available at
TheftStop.ie.
As the theft of livestock occurs on both sides of
the border and these animals are being
slaughtered and entering the food chain both
north and south, a Cross Border Task Force has
been set up to tackle this serious threat to
farming, the agri food industry and the
community who unwittingly purchase beef
products that have entered the food chain
without proper regulation. The task force brings
all the relevant agencies together on both sides
of the border such as police investigators, food
safety and food standards authorities,
Departments of Agriculture and any other agency
deemed necessary to assist and prevent, detect
and deter this criminal activity. 
There are a number of operations ongoing at
present with specific targets identified in relation
to the illegal slaughtering of stolen or smuggled
animals across the border and regular meetings
are held on both sides of the border to progress
these new initiatives. The FSAI and AGS assisted
in the investigation of a farmer from Co.
Monaghan in relation to stolen livestock in the
border region. The suspect was convicted in
September 2015 for handling stolen cattle and
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received a five month prison sentence. It is
anticipated that this conviction will help to deter
others from engaging in the criminal enterprise
relating to stolen animals in the border region.  
Plant and Machinery Theft
Similar to Livestock theft above, this has fallen
from the high level recorded in 2013.
Marking schemes such as CESAR and DataTag
are likely to have had an impact, with insurers
giving considerable financial incentives to install
such security measures.
The theft of high value tractors has fallen in the
last 12-18 months.  There is evidence that in
recent years stolen high value tractors were
routinely moved out of NI, often first going
through the land border with the ROI before
leaving from an ROI Port.  Farm machinery was
recovered in Germany almost three years after it
was stolen in Tyrone, and evidence would suggest
it crossed the Border to ROI before being shipped
to the Continent with forged documents.
Similarly, tractors and plant stolen elsewhere
come onto NI via both ROI as well as local ports.
The sums of money involved are huge.
Despite the decreasing volume of reported
offences in Northern Ireland Rural / Agricultural
crime has significant community impact in Border
areas. As a consequence it is recommended that
it is considered as a priority area for the Cross
Border Task Force.
An Garda Síochána Stolen Motor Vehicle
Investigation Unit attached to the National
Bureau of Criminal Investigation is currently
involved in a number of Cross Border
Investigations where vehicles, plant and
agricultural machinery stolen in Northern Ireland
has been recovered in the South and similarly
vehicles, plant and machinery stolen in the
Republic has been located in Northern Ireland. 
A Cross Border conference was held on 2nd
August 2016 at Carrickmacross Garda Station in
relation to the activities of a Co. Monaghan
target. The focus of the conference was to put a
Cross Border operation in place to investigate the
target who owns properties on both sides of the
border and operates a large salvage yard in Co.
Monaghan. A number of vehicles stolen in the
greater Dublin area have been intercepted
enroute to the target’s premises. The conference
was attended by AGS and PSNI members. The
next conference is scheduled for the middle of
September 2016. 
5.10 Firearms
Current Situation
It is assessed that a minimum of 41% of identified
Northern Ireland based OCGs have access to
firearms.
Firearms continue to be:
a. Procured from the Republic of Ireland and 
further afield.
b. Targeted and stolen during burglaries (on 
both sides of the border).
c. Illegally re-activated.
d. Utilised in other crimes (including murders,
attempted murders and armed robberies).
e. Used to exert control over vulnerable 
communities and to threaten or intimidate 
criminal competitors.
f. Sold or swapped for cash or other 
commodities.
In February 2016 members from the Stolen Motor
Vehicle Investigation Unit (SMVIU) liaised with
PSNI colleagues in relation to the theft of
agricultural tractors from Northern Ireland which
were recovered in Co. Monaghan. Two suspects
were subsequently arrested by the PSNI after a
pursuit following the theft of a New Holland
tractor and Diet feeder in South Armagh. On 25th
February 2016 members from SMVIU and
Monaghan recovered a large New Holland Tractor
in Co. Monaghan. The tractor had been reported
stolen from outside Dungannon, Co Tyrone.
Enquiries are ongoing in relation to this joint
investigation between AGS and PSNI. 
Case Study 6
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Cross Border Activity
Information suggests that OCGs from both
jurisdictions have been involved in sourcing
firearms from criminal groups on the other side
of the border. The risk of harm that these
transactions lead to cannot be underestimated.
Much of this activity is linked to OCGs who are
also involved in drug related crime. There is also
a risk that these firearms will end up in the
possession of paramilitary organisations.
5.11 ATM Thefts
Current Threat and Emerging Issues 
The physical theft of ATMs initially became an
issue on the island of Ireland in 2009/10, when a
series of incidents, involving the use of stolen
plant machinery, was perpetrated on both sides
of the border.  There was one organised crime
group linked to the earliest recorded incidents,
however, despite limited success in actually
gaining access to the ATMs, the subsequent
media coverage resulted in a series of ‘copycat’
offences.  Some of the identified groups were
operating on both sides of the border.  Parallel
investigations in both jurisdictions led to the
number of incidents reducing dramatically in
subsequent years.
Over the last two years a new modus operandi in
relation to physical ATM attacks has emerged.
Following a series of incidents in Europe and
Great Britain, ATM attacks using gas have now
migrated to Ireland.  Similar to the attacks using
stolen plant machinery, gas attacks cause
significant damage to properties and can lead to
the loss of valuable services in rural communities.
Gas attacks result in an explosion taking place
and pose significant risks to emergency service
responders, as well as any members of the public
who may be in the vicinity.
In a three week period during November 2015
there were a total of five ATM attacks in
Northern Ireland. The photograph below is of
the scene of one of these attacks. This occurred
in the Newry area. Two of these attacks involved
the use of gas, the only two gas attacks noted in
Northern Ireland in the 2015 calendar year. The
numbers and level of sophistication noted in gas
attacks in 2015 have reduced compared to
2014; this may be partly due to the successful
arrest and charging of offenders after attacks in
2014. However, ATM gas attacks underwent
resurgence during the final quarter of 2015 in
the Republic of Ireland, with six separate
incidents or attempts being recorded during the
period. In total there were seven ATM gas
attacks in the Republic of Ireland during 2015.
Each of these incidents were unsuccessful in
gaining access to the ATM however there was
significant damage caused in several incidents.
At least some of these attacks are suspected to
have been carried out by an OCG comprising
Romanian nationals. In June 2014 two
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Romanian nationals were arrested following a
similar incident at an ATM at Hamiltonsbawn in
County Armagh. Two vehicles used during the
commission of this offence were registered to an
address in Dublin. These individuals have also
been linked to human trafficking.
In all there have been nineteen recorded incidents
of ATM gas attacks in the Republic of Ireland
since February 2014. There was one recorded
incident of a physical attack on an ATM on the
15th of April 2015 in Castleblaney where a JCB
was used to remove the ATM. 
5.12 Vehicle Crime
In respect of vehicle crime the general trends
appear to remain as outlined in the last Cross
Border Organised Crime Assessment. The trend
of ‘Ghost Thefts’ is still prevalent across the
island, similarly the running of ‘Chop Shops’
remains an area of focus for both police services.
The Stolen Motor Vehicle Investigation Unit
works with the Police Service of Northern Ireland
on an ongoing basis.
5.13 Intellectual Property Crime
The sale of counterfeit goods in both jurisdictions
is not only confined to markets, street traders,
car-boot sales or door to door sellers in recent
years the growth of internet trading via websites
such as Facebook, Donedeal, and many others
have contributed to the growth in trade of
counterfeit goods.
The most common type of counterfeit products
discovered in both jurisdictions is designer or
brand name clothes and handbags.  However,
there are frequently seizures of sportswear and
sports goods, pharmaceutical products,
cigarettes, alcohol, power tools, electronics,
jewellery, toiletries, cosmetics, laundry products
and motor accessories and parts.  Emerging
trends from online sales are evidence that any
type of product can be counterfeit.  Interpol has
estimated that between 6% and 8% of world trade
is in fact trade in counterfeit goods. The National
Bureau of Criminal Investigations (NBCI) work
closely with the PSNI, Her Majesty’s Revenue and
Customs, The National Crime Agency, and the
Irish Revenue Commissioners (Customs) in
respect of these crimes.
Over the past two years the Gardai (in particular
the Intellectual Property Crime Unit at the
National Bureau of Criminal Investigation) have
worked closely with Irish Customs & Excise to
identify importers/distributors of counterfeit
goods and bring the perpetrators to justice.
Additionally in some cases a tax audit is
undertaken by the Revenue Commissioners to
identify any revenue issues that are associated
with this illegal activity.
There have been in excess of twenty five joint
operations, on a nationwide basis, where
controlled deliveries have been affected against
the consignors of the counterfeit goods.  The
receiving premises for the delivery have been
searched and the goods recovered and seized. To
date this has led to the seizure of a large variety
of counterfeit goods including clothing, footwear,
cosmetics, perfume, sporting goods, watches,
handbags, purses etc.  It is estimated that the
value of these goods exceeds €1 million.
On the 3rd of January as part of Operation Bolus
An Garda Síochána recovered an Audi A4, Audi
A5, Audi A6 and a Range Rover stolen from
Northern Ireland. The vehicles were recovered at
an underground car park near Dublin Airport. The
total value of the vehicles was €163,000. The
vehicles had been professionally rung with false
identities.  In June 2015 An Garda Síochána
worked closely with colleagues in the Police
Service of Northern Ireland and in the Port of
Dover which led to the recovery of a stolen BMW
X5 from Ashbourne, Co Meath and a BMW 520
from Newry, Co Down. These vehicles were
bound for Lithuania on a transporter. The details
of the suspects were circulated though Europol
and the male suspect was arrested transiting
through Stansted Airport found in possession of
equipment to take vehicles without keys. He was
arrested by the PSNI for handing stolen vehicles
and is remanded in custody. 
Case Study 7
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In two of these operations, where the suspected
goods were destined for locations close to the
border, the PSNI were contacted and they
provided support should the goods moved into
NI. 
In recent years there have been a number of
seizures by Revenue Officials (in the Republic of
Ireland) relating to Intellectual Property Rights
(IPR) from postal importations through mail
centres. In general these have been lower values
and smaller number of items. In some cases joint
investigations have ensued due to the nature of
the product discovered in the packages. 
Food and Beverage Fraud – There have been
occasional detections in the Republic of Ireland
of beverage fraud, specifically counterfeit vodka.
Smirnoff vodka in particular continues to be a
target for counterfeiters and in 2015 a labelling
plant involving this product was encountered in a
warehouse near the Border area (*see also page
17, “Alcohol” under point 5.3 “Excise Fraud”).
EU Focus – During 2015, the EU Anti-fraud
Office OLAF had open investigations with regard
to imports into the EU of counterfeit coffee,
shampoo, perfumes, wheel bearings, toys,
electronic goods, and aluminium road wheels.
OLAF has also recently identified threats with
regard to counterfeit semi-conductors for use
across the industrial and consumer sector and
counterfeit spare parts for automobiles, trains,
and aircraft. Both of these threats not only
infringe intellectual property rights, but posed
significant risks to public health and consumer
safety. Joint operations at EU level are being
planned to target imports of these products.
5.14 Child Sexual Exploitation (CSE) 
The PSNI has developed its response to CSE
quite significantly over the last number of
months. Each Public Protection Unit (PPU) across
the province has a CSE team comprised of a
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number of Constables led by a Sergeant and
Inspector. New structures maximise opportunities
for more effective partnership and collaborative
working.
There are currently 84 persons on the PSNI
master-list of identified children deemed at high
risk of CSE.  Children are deemed at high risk
after a joint assessment process is conducted
using a risk assessment tool and professional
judgement by police officers and social workers
operating in the field of CSE. Once children are
identified through this process they are flagged
and a subject profile including fast track actions
is attached to their file to assist in the operational
response to any incident they may be involved in.
This greatly assists uniform officers in
investigating missing person reports and ensures
that risks are readily identified, prioritised and
managed.
Contact is maintained with children on this list by
CSE officers.  Regular meetings are held between
professionals on a monthly basis to ensure all
safeguarding is in place in respect of the children
and any investigative opportunities are explored
on a rolling basis.
A total of 43 incidents have been flagged as CSE,
including missing person investigations since the
flagging system has become operational on 12th
November 2015.
Persons of interest (suspects), who are believed
to be linked to CSE activity, are also flagged.  This
enhances our ability to disrupt these offenders by
providing a more comprehensive picture and
allowing investigative links to be made.  Again
this is a fairly new system of work which is still in
its infancy.
CSE is undoubtedly happening in Northern
Ireland, but at this stage there is no intelligence
to suggest it is happening on an organised scale
similar to that seen in other parts of the United
Kingdom.
Work is currently underway to progress an
Information Sharing Agreement between PSNI
and An Garda Síochána in relation to
safeguarding children.
A total of 15 children were identified in the
Republic of Ireland as suspected victims of sexual
exploitation in 2015 which is an increase on the
2014 figures which numbered eight. These cases
relate to the sexual exploitation of these children
and charges under Section 3 (2) of the Criminal
law (Human Trafficking) Act 2008 have been
preferred in all of these cases. The major trend is
that these children have been exploited by Irish
adults.
An Garda Síochána has no evidence of cross
border Child Sexual Exploitation by organised
crime groups. The only cross-border sexual
exploitation related to individuals communicating
with children via the internet but this form of CSE
would tend to involve sole perpetrators and
multiple victims from many countries, including
the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland.
Cross Border Activity
While NCA have been operating against
offenders engaged in Child Sexual Exploitation
and abuse in Northern Ireland, NCA holds no
specific information relating to crime groups
participating in the sexual exploitation of children
with an MO of operating across the border
between NI and the Republic of Ireland. That
said, it is assessed that cross-border
vulnerabilities for child sexual exploitation are
those common to every country, namely that the
use of the internet allows offenders to operate in
virtual networks that operate irrespective of
national boundaries, with little need to physically
locate to the same country. NCA have noted
nationally that the level of sharing of indecent
images of children are judged to have increased
by 275% since 2010 and are still assessed as
increasing. 
34
Cross Border Organised Crime Assessment 2016
Notes
35
Cross Border Organised Crime Assessment 2016
Notes
This document is produced with the help of
An Garda Síochána
Garda Headquarters
Phoenix Park
Dublin 8
Tel: +353 (0)1 666 0000
Web: www.garda.ie
The Police Service of
Northern Ireland
Police Headquarters
65 Knock Road
Belfast BT5 6LE
Tel: +44 (0)28 9065 0222
Web: www.psni.police.uk
This document is jointly published by
Department of Justice
Block B
Castle Buildings
Stormont Estate
Belfast BT4 3SG
Tel: +44 (0)28 90 527668
Department of Justice and Equality
94 St. Stephen’s Green, Dublin 2
Tel: +353 (0)1 602 8202
Web: wwwjustice.ie
